A dramatic shift in US foreign policy towards Russia threatens to leave Ukraine without vital support
Washington initiated putative peace talks with Moscow last week that appear to bypass Ukraine. As part of a revolutionary shift in US foreign policy, President Donald Trump has rushed to reset US relations with Russia, including pressing for an end to the war in Ukraine. Trump’s change in direction is the most important single event in three years of war and has alarmed US allies in Ukraine and Europe.
What next
Subsidiary Impacts
- A bilateral deal between Washington and Moscow would undermine NATO cohesion.
- Any peace deal, even on poor terms for Ukraine, will likely boost Europe’s economic fortunes.
- Even modest US sanctions relief will boost Russia’s economic prospects.
Analysis
Three years after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war continues with only modest territorial gains made by either side.
Neither side is currently able to achieve a fast-paced breakthrough on the battlefield. However, Russian forces have maintained a slow momentum for the past year that has enabled them to capture several fortress positions in the Donbas that had previously proven impenetrable (see UKRAINE: Military will struggle to regain initiative – September 2, 2024).
Nevertheless, there remains little prospect in the immediate term that either side can rapidly overcome entrenched defensive positions along the frontline.
Kursk operation continues
Although Ukrainian forces made rapid advances into Russia’s Kursk oblast (region) in August, this took place due to them enjoying an element of surprise and because defensive positions in the area were relatively weak (see UKRAINE: Surprise attack raises stakes for Kyiv – August 9, 2024).
Ukraine has lost over half of the territory it occupied in the Kursk region
However, Ukraine lacked the forces to build on its initial gains. After capturing around 1, 100 square kilometres (km2) within the first month of the operation, Ukrainian forces have seen the area under their complete control shrink to just over 400 km2 by February 21.
Even bolstered by North Korean troops, Russian forces have failed to dislodge Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region completely. Elements from several well-armed and experienced Ukrainian brigades are well-embedded in and around the small town of Sudzha and look well-placed to maintain their positions.
Signs of Russian adaptation
Russia’s military has shown signs of significant adaptation after the dismal display during the first six months of 2022. These innovations include:
- the large-scale use of air-launched guided glide bombs (KABs) to target fortified fixed Ukrainian positions;
- more sophisticated and larger-scale use of aerial drones for both surveillance and attack, including the use of fibre-optic drones that are impervious to electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures; (see RUSSIA: The importance of aerial drones will rise – January 15, 2025); and
- a shift towards the use of small-unit assaults, supported by drones, artillery and small numbers of armoured vehicles.
Along with superior availability of manpower and munitions, these developments enabled Russian forces to make slow but steady gains of around 20 km2 per day on average in the second half of 2024, helped by the inability of Ukrainian forces to move artillery forward.
High numbers of soldiers killed
Despite achieving grinding advances throughout 2024, Russian commanders have not been able to translate tactical-level innovation into a decisive operational breakthrough. Moreoever, their gains have been made at the expense of high personnel losses.
Although estimates vary, the most reliable sources suggest that at least 150,000 Russian soldiers have been killed over the past three years. The number of wounded is much higher.
In December 2024, Zelensky said Ukrainian forces had suffered over 43,000 killed in action. However, this figure is likely to be a significant underestimate due to tens of thousands of soldiers being classified as ‘missing’.
Russia’s battlefield focus
Moscow’s primary effort is on Donetsk oblast in eastern Ukraine, one of four oblasts President Vladimir Putin declared part of Russia in September 2022. However, Russian forces remain some way from bringing the region under its full control.
The focus of Russia’s offensive actions has been in Donetsk
For over six months, Moscow has been attempting to encircle and ultimately capture the city of Pokrovsk. However, its progress has been slowed by a determined Ukrainian defence, with Russian and Ukrainian sources indicating significant problems caused by the employment of aerial drones.
Nevertheless, Moscow appears intent on breaking Ukraine’s four-city ‘fortress belt’ in the area — Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka — with recent large-scale redeployments in the direction of the last of these, suggesting a shift in emphasis in the quest for a breakthrough.
Ukrainian adaptation
Despite delays in delivering Western aid in early 2024 and mounting manpower shortages, Ukrainian forces have remained resolute in their defence across the frontline. Like Russia’s, they have continued to adapt and innovate on the battlefield.
They have used long-range aerial drones and missiles to strike significant oil, military, ammunition and logistical points up to 1,150 km inside Russia and occupied territories.
Ukraine’s defence industry has been working to create new, standardised aerial drones and long-range missiles — the latter (‘rocket drones’) include the Palianytsia and the newly announced Peklo, which has a range of 700 km, more than twice that of Western-supplied missiles, and can be used without the restrictions on use imposed by Western suppliers.
Kyiv has also moved to address mounting manpower shortages (see UKRAINE: Manpower shortages will hamper military – January 13, 2025). Due to the decision not to conscript personnel under the age of 24 to preserve the relatively scarce youth cohort, Kyiv began a voluntary recruitment scheme for 18-24-year-olds in February 2025. If the scheme is successful, it will significantly increase force size.
Aside from having numerically smaller forces, Ukraine’s biggest challenge is integrating its armed forces at higher levels to make a more coherent whole of its often-impressive parts.
Reduced US support?
Ukraine’s most acute threat currently comes from its most important ally to date, the United States. Trump’s dramatic shift towards Russia and his desire to achieve a quick peace — even if it is on Moscow’s terms — threatens to leave Ukraine without some of its most important sources of external support (see UNITED STATES: Ukraine U-turn is part of wider shift – February 20, 2025).
On February 20, House Speaker Mike Johnson declared there was “no appetite” for a new US congressional funding package for Ukraine to replace the USD61bn approved after much delay in April 2024 (see UNITED STATES: Aid bill points up foreign policy rifts – May 3, 2024). Replacing Ukraine’s single largest source of military aid will be a gargantuan challenge for Kyiv’s other allies.
Ukraine’s access to US-supplied intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets has also been crucial throughout the war. Ukrainian forces would be immediately weakened if Washington cuts Kyiv’s access to these vital force enablers.
US intelligence and surveillance support has proven vital to Ukraine through the war
Kyiv’s vulnerability in this area was highlighted when it was reported on February 21 that Washington threatened to cut off Ukraine’s access to the Elon Musk-owned Starlink satellite system if Kyiv did not agree to a deal with the United States regarding critical mineral resources.
