Colombia has declared a state of emergency over insecurity in Catatumbo, which has seen ELN peace prospects collapse
President Gustavo Petro declared a state of emergency last week, amid soaring violence in Catatumbo, Norte de Santander. The fighting — between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 33rd Front — a dissident group of the defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) — has killed dozens of people and displaced more than 32,000. Petro has halted peace talks with the ELN, categorising the group as criminals and terrorists.
What next
Constitutional Court approval of the emergency declaration will allow the government to make budgetary allocations to address the crisis. Security conditions are likely to deteriorate further near the Venezuelan border and in other areas where the ELN is present. For the most part, the ELN will target enemy fighters, security personnel and critical infrastructure. However, it will do so with little regard for civilians, increasing the likelihood of further collateral damage.
Subsidiary Impacts
- ELN peace talks have been suspended before, but on this occasion the move looks likely to be permanent.
- The ELN’s alleged relationship with Caracas will sour Colombia-Venezuela relations and draw the attention of Washington.
- The erosion of the security situation will dent Petro’s reputation as a peacemaker both domestically and with external partners.
Analysis
Under its current leadership, the ELN has employed a strategy of ‘submission or death’ over local communities believed to be aiding and abetting their rivals. This has seen large numbers of civilians — some demobilised FARC members, who the ELN does not consider civilians, and others bystanders with no direct involvement in the conflict — become targeted or otherwise caught up in the group’s violence.
The ELN’s escalation of violence follows a breakdown of territorial and economic agreements between itself and the FARC dissidents, and claims by the ELN of being targeted by rival armed groups and intelligence operations.
The crisis is compounded by the lack of state presence in rural Colombia and the dominance of narcotrafficking interests. Local and national authorities are now grappling with the dual challenge of addressing the humanitarian emergency and restoring order in the conflict-ridden northeast.
In response to the crisis, on January 22, Petro declared an internal state of emergency and suspended peace negotiations with the ELN, condemning the group’s actions as criminal rather than political. The Colombian army has deployed 300 special forces to neutralise clashes in Catatumbo and assist in security guarantees for civilians. Aerial medical evacuations by the military and humanitarian assistance by government agencies and international organisations are underway.
Peace signatories
Some of the people who have been specifically targeted in the recent violence are former FARC combatants who became signatories to that group’s 2016 peace agreement (see COLOMBIA: Peace deal may face dangerous delays – December 5, 2016). The ELN has accused signatories of collaborating with FARC dissidents and/or the government and appears to view them as complicating its efforts to control strategic border territories near Venezuela.
The latest violence has seen renewed intervention appeals to the UN Security Council by signatories, who have highlighted the dire consequences attacks could have for the peace process and civilian populations. Since the signing of the 2016 agreement, 441 signatories have been assassinated, as reported by the UN Verification Mission, albeit not all by the ELN.
FARC peace process signatories reportedly murdered since 2016
The government’s ongoing failure to guarantee the safety of peace deal signatories and demobilised former guerrillas more generally makes it difficult for still-active armed groups to trust promises of protection and invest fully in peace processes. While reports emerged on January 25 of several dozen FARC dissidents having agreed to demobilise, feelings of insecurity feed a general reluctance among fighters to disarm, hindering progress with negotiations.
‘Total Peace’
This month’s violence spike deals a major blow to Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ initiative, through which he aimed to engage all of Colombia’s armed groups in dialogue (see COLOMBIA: Petro’s ‘total peace’ will face obstacles – January 25, 2023 and see COLOMBIA: ‘Total peace’ will not materialise in 2024 – January 16, 2024). As Colombia’s largest remaining guerrilla group, the ELN formed the symbolic backbone of the strategy.
While peace talks with the ELN initially showed promise, with a six-month ceasefire in 2023 and a year-long armistice in 2024, repeated violations, including kidnappings and attacks, derailed progress (see COLOMBIA: ELN ceasefire is fragile step towards peace – June 22, 2023). An attack on a military base in Arauca in September 2024 led to talks being suspended, but hopes of their resumption remained. In this case, with the latest incident involving attacks on civilians and trust now severely undermined, the chances of a return to talks look remote.
Indeed, the ELN central command released a statement on January 26 slamming the Total Peace strategy as having allowed non-state armed groups to coordinate with the state and the armed forces in attempting to force the ELN to surrender and submit — two actions that it re-asserted its refusal to entertain.
With hostilities now seemingly fully resumed, violence looks set to spread and worsen in other areas where the ELN is present, including the departments of Arauca, Bolivar, Cauca, Choco and Santander, drawing other groups into the action.
The situation will compound longstanding criticisms of Petro’s strategy. According to an Invamer poll released in December (before this month’s violence), 53% of Colombians already disagreed with the continuation of peace negotiations with the ELN, while 72% believed the government’s implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC was going in the wrong direction. Given the complexity of Colombia’s armed conflict and the lucrative nature of its illegal economy, Total Peace was always an ambitious goal, but with less than two years of Petro’s presidency remaining, its achievement now looks near-impossible.
The prospect of successful negotiations under the current government looks even bleaker in the context of deteriorating relations with Venezuela, which has been a key player in negotiations, acting as a guarantor in ELN talks. Ties have soured over Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s contested re-election in July, Petro’s refusal to recognise it as legitimate, and the presumed use of Venezuelan territory by ELN fighters ahead of this month’s violence (see VENEZUELA: Disputed election leaves uncertain future – August 7, 2024 and see COLOMBIA: Venezuela stance may hit Petro’s approval – September 13, 2024).
Venezuela
On January 22, as the Catatumbo crisis escalated, Maduro ordered the deployment of more than 2,000 troops to the Colombian border — ostensibly to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to displaced Colombians. Maduro stated that the focus of the operation was on establishing “peace, stability and tranquility,” and that efforts would be coordinated with Colombian authorities.
Tensions are nevertheless simmering over the ELN’s apparent use of Venezuela to move fighters to Catatumbo from Arauca. According to a Colombian military intelligence report made public by the press last week, at least 80 ELN members travelled from Arauca, through the Venezuelan states of Tachira and Zulia, re-entering Colombia further north.
The claim that ELN fighters travelled between their Arauca and Norte de Santander strongholds via Venezuela highlights the longstanding problem of Colombian guerrilla groups using Venezuelan territory for strategic and logistical purposes, raising awkward questions not only about the Maduro administration’s relationship with the ELN, but about whether Caracas should be considered a partner or a hostile player in cross-border security efforts more generally.
If evidence emerges, or a belief takes hold in Bogota, that Caracas actively facilitates the movement of non-state armed groups violently aiming to contest control over areas of Colombian territory, bilateral relations could quickly sour further.
